It is necessary to distinguishgeneral from collective names. A general name is one which can be predicated of each individual of a multitude; a collective name can not be predicated of each separately, but only of all taken together. The 76th regiment of foot in the British army, which is a collective name, is not a general but an individual name; for though it can be predicated of a multitude of individual soldiers taken jointly, it can not be predicated of them severally. We may say, Jones is a soldier, and Thompson is a soldier, and Smith is a soldier, but we can not say, Jones is the 76th regiment, and Thompson is the 76th regiment, and Smith is the 76th regiment. We can only say, Jones, and Thompson, and Smith, and Brown, and so forth (enumerating all the soldiers), are the 76th regiment. Rob was conscious of flinging his left arm over and around, locking the leg, holding the foot under him. He felt a black wave of nausea but hung on to the mans foot and leg with dogged persistence and kept a firm grip on the gun with his right hand. Conformably to what we have before remarked to be of frequent occurrence, this fallacy might without much impropriety have been placed in a different class, among Fallacies of Generalization; for experience does afford a certain degree of countenance to the assumption. The cause does, in very many cases, resemble its effect; like produces like. Many phenomena have a direct tendency to perpetuate their own existence, or to give rise to other phenomena similar to themselves. Not to mention forms actually moulded on one another, as impressions on wax and the like, in which the closest resemblance between the effect and its cause is the very law of the phenomenon; all motion tends to continue itself, with its own velocity, and in its own original direction; and the motion of one body tends to set others in motion, which is indeed the most common of the modes in which the motions of bodies originate. We need scarcely refer to contagion, fermentation, and the like; or to the production of effects by the growth or expansion of a germ or rudiment resembling on a smaller scale the completed phenomenon, as in the growth of a plant or animal from an embryo, that embryo itself deriving its origin from another plant or animal of the same kind. Again, the thoughts or reminiscences, which are effects of our past sensations, resemble those sensations; feelings produce similar feelings by way of sympathy; acts produce similar acts by involuntary or voluntary imitation. With so many appearances in its favor, no wonder if a presumption naturally grew up, that causes mustnecessarily resemble their effects, and that like could only be produced by like. No. Private cop. Didnt Macintosh tell you? Professor Bain[38]distinguishes two kinds of Propositions of Co-existence. In the one kind, account is taken of Place; they may be described as propositions of Order in Place. In the other kind, the co-existence which is predicated is termed by Mr. Bain Co-inherence of Attributes. “This is a distinct variety of Propositions of Co-existence. Instead of an arrangement in place with numerical intervals, we have the concurrence of two or more attributes or powers in the same part or locality. A mass of gold contains, in every atom, the concurring attributes that mark the substance—weight, hardness, color, lustre, incorrosibility, etc. An animal, besides having parts situated in place, has co-inhering functions in the same parts, exerted by the very same masses and molecules of its substance.... The Mind, which affords no Propositions of Order in Place, has co-inhering functions. We affirm mindto contain Feeling, Will, and Thought, not in local separation, but in commingling exercise. The concurring properties of minerals, of plants, and of the bodily and the mental structure of animals, are united in affirmations of co-inherence. But a doctor says shes... He said:Wait a minute, and then: “Ill meet you. Right away? Crandall said:What am I being arrested for? If this is a fraud, Im no party to it. Naturally not. Isnt it possible that Sven Lindqvist in Stockholm was the recruiter who enlisted her? She came back to the U.S. as a sleeper, only to be summoned abroad by him several months later when she received an urgent message to sell all our band equipment and rush back to Stockholm, where for the first time she was to meet her European counterpart, the infamous UN translator named Sally Jean. Sven has been her control ever since. It is Sven who sends her all over the world on secret assignments. It is Sven who brought together the team of surgeons who spirited her off that Air France flight and installed a radio transmitter in her skull or her rectum or wherever. It is Sven who sent her down to Greenwich Village that New Year’s Eve to spy on the guys from Dartmouth and Harvard, two hotbeds of Communist activity. It is Sven who brought her back from India disguised as a Tantric adept in baggy pants and sandals with hennaed hair and a silver circlet over her right eye and lice that were probably radio transmitters in their own right. It is Sven, too, who arranged for the agent Wally Hennessy (ah-ha! Abooking agent, or anFBI agent?) to send The Gutter Rats on a tour of the South, where Annie would contact her Georgian counterpart, Harley Welles, disguised as a redneck policeman, and henceforth exchange vital nuclear secrets hidden in her urine, which she generously sprayed all over Harley’s uniform leg and polished black shoes while the black secret agent Pearl Williams stood by taking discreet notes. It is Sven who arranged for her to rendezvous once again with Sally Jean in Amsterdam, where she scattered broken glass around her bed and searched her bags for secrets. I do not mean to assert that the promotion of happiness should be itself the end of all actions, or even of all rules of action. It is the justification, and ought to be the controller, of all ends, but it is not itself the sole end. There are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes of action (though the cases are, I think, less frequent than is often supposed), by which happiness in the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being produced than pleasure. But conduct of which this can be truly asserted, admits of justification only because it can be shown that, on the whole, more happiness will exist in the world, if feelings are cultivated which will make people, in certain cases, regardless of happiness. I fully admit that this is true; that the cultivation of an ideal nobleness of will and conduct should be to individual human beings an end, to which the specific pursuit either of their own happiness or of that of others (except so far as included in that idea) should, in any case of conflict, give way. But I hold that the very question, what constitutes this elevation of character, is itself to be decided by a reference to happiness as the standard. The character itself should be, to the individual, a paramount end, simply because the existence of this ideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to it, in any abundance, would go farther than all things else toward making human life happy,both in the comparatively humble sense of pleasure and freedom from pain, and in the higher meaning, of rendering life, not what it now is almost universally, puerile and insignificant, but such as human beings with highly developed faculties can care to have. Ive already spoken to someone, I say. Anaccidens: (συμβεβηκός). Youre not going to get away from me up there, you evil bastard, Roy!’ Esmonde’s voice was full of bitter anger. ‘You’ve put yourself into a trap — a rat trap! Tut tut, and I thought you were smart. Not too smart now, are you? I’m coming for you! I’ve got two very special cartridges with nice heavy shot for bringing down wild boars. Just right for shooting a pig!’ Uh-huh? The favorite argument against Berkeleys theory of the non-existence of matter, and the most popularly effective, next to agrin[267]—an argument, moreover, which is not confined to “coxcombs, nor to men like Samuel Johnson, whose greatly overrated ability certainly did not lie in the direction of metaphysical speculation, but is the stock argument of the Scotch school of metaphysicians—is a palpable Ignoratio Elenchi. The argument is perhaps as frequently expressed by gesture as by words, and one of its commonest forms consists in knocking a stick against the ground. This short and easy confutation overlooks the fact, that in denying matter, Berkeley did not deny any thing to which our senses bear witness, and therefore can not be answered by any appeal to them. His skepticism related to the supposed substratum, or hidden cause of the appearances perceived by our senses; the evidence of which, whatever may be thought of its conclusiveness, is certainly not the evidence of sense. And it will always remain a signal proof of the want of metaphysical profundity of Reid, Stewart, and, I am sorry to add, of Brown, that they should have persisted in asserting that Berkeley, if he believed his own doctrine, was bound to walk into the kennel, or run his head against a post. As if persons who do not recognize an occult cause of their sensations could not possibly believe that a fixed order subsists among the sensations themselves. Such a want of comprehension of the distinction between a thing and its sensible manifestation, or, in metaphysical language, between the noumenon and the phenomenon, would be impossible to even the dullest disciple of Kant or Coleridge. She stopped shaking drinks then and put the shaker down. She came over to me and snuggled up and said:Id always talk to you, honey. Is Macintosh there?.